Just two months ago, Europe felt like it was at a political crossroads.
The European Parliamentary elections – where some commentators predicted a populist political earthquake – were due to take place in early June. Beyond this were a number of key events: the G7 summit taking place in Bari mid-June; major political challenges for an unpopular French government and a weak German coalition; the implications for the European Commission of the EP elections, and the knock-on impact on whether Ursula von der Leyen would secure a second term as Commission President in Brussels; the prospect at some point of a UK general election; and, further down the track, COP 29, to be hosted in the European neighborhood city of Baku in November – preceded by the customary scene-setter in June, in the form of the UNFCCC inter-sessional in Bonn.
With most European politicians now taking off on their summer holidays, this blog examines the consequential events of the last two months, focusing on the decisions taken or that will be taken in seven cities (Bonn, Bari, Paris, Berlin, Brussels, London, Baku), and what they mean for the European energy transition and climate action.
First, those two weeks in Bonn from 3-13 June. These talks can seem prosaic and technical. But the substance and especially the atmospherics matter; and the verdict on the meagre progress in Bonn – especially on international climate finance – did not point to a positive conclusion at COP29. In particular, there was little meeting of minds between Global North and Global South negotiators on the scale or blend of finance that should be made available by the developed world to support the challenge of the transition for developing countries. Northern countries’ emphasis on voluntary carbon markets seems to be something of a sore point.
These talks in Bonn unfolded against the backdrop of European parliamentary elections across the EU. The good news for climate action was that overall the extreme right, populist bloc who oppose net-zero failed to win the major breakthrough their national parties had been campaigning for. The centrist bloc of EPP, Renew and Social Democrats emerged largely unscathed, and the Greens were weakened but not mortally wounded.
But what no-one had predicted is that a strong set of results for France’s National Rally Party (as well as the left-leaning bloc) would force President Macron to respond to this “expression of anger” by dissolving the National Assembly and calling a parliamentary election. Despite the widespread criticism of Macron’s decision, in the event, the National Rally have not won the overall parliamentary majority they might have expected. The Left have strength in numbers, and so the horse-trading on a new government continues. It’s still not clear where these negotiations will end up, but President Macron’s authority within the EU does feel a little diminished.
Germany’s political system is quite different to France, and a direct comparison with Chancellor Scholz’s position is not straightforward. But where he and Macron can compare notes is on their (lack of) political authority. Despite starting fast in response to the invasion of Ukraine, Scholz’s time in office over the last three years has been of steadily reducing political returns, based partly on the declining support for his coalition partners the Greens. The next federal elections in Germany, in September 2025, may herald a turn to the right (although much can still happen between now and then). This might argue for the coalition to use whatever political capital they retain in the meantime to cash in on climate action – although whether they can do so under the present tight constraints of the federal budget is dubious.
Macron and Scholz were of course there at the G7 Summit in Bari on 13-15 June. This ended in another underwhelming outcome on climate and energy, with the Communique largely repeating the conclusions of the Dubai consensus and confirming the widely-held disappointment in the international community’s failure since COP28 to make any meaningful progress on transitioning away from fossil fuels and fossil subsidies.
Little wonder, then, that progressives have been buoyed by the Labour Party’s landslide in the UK General Election earlier this month. While climate didn’t prove as high-profile in the election campaign as some had expected, the new Government – supported by detailed post-election polling – can claim they have a mandate to step change on both the green (symbolized by its plans to establish a public body, GB Energy, to promote renewable energy) and the incumbent fossil fuel industry (given Labour’s declared intention to issue no new oil and gas licences).
There are also signs that new Prime Minister Starmer plans to use co-operation on energy security – alongside foreign and defence policy, and migration – as one of the pillars to re-set relations for the UK with the EU. Europe recognizes the UK’s strong legacy, e.g. the establishment of the Climate Change Act as long ago as 2008. And the UK’s new Secretary of State on energy security and net-zero, Ed Miliband, is already being noticeably bullish about the need to get off reliance on fossil fuels, with a consistent message that renewables are good for energy prices and for energy security.
Attention has most recently switched to Brussels where, on 18 July, Ursula von der Leyen delivered the “manifesto” speech to the European Parliament which ultimately helped her to secure a comfortable majority for another five year mandate as Commission President. There are still concerns that von der Leyen is hedging her bets on climate ambition. But the front-foot remarks in her speech about sticking to the targets of the Green Deal will have provided some reassurance about the Commission’s commitment to climate in her new term. Furthermore, the priority she gave to proposing a new “Clean Industrial Deal” in the first 100 days – to address the holy trinity of investment, competitiveness and decarbonization – was striking.
Mario Draghi will reportedly be submitting his report on overall European competitiveness to the Commission in September, providing further important input to von der Leyen’s industrial strategy. Her plans will have to strike a careful balance between internal European coherence and what the EU can say about international leadership.
In conclusion, despite some of the turbulence in key EU member states (and that Hungary of all countries now holds the EU Presidency until the end of the year), at least some clarity at the EU institutional level is starting to emerge. European leadership on the transition in international fora, even if it’s disputed internally, ought therefore to come back into focus.
This leads us back on to the pathway from Bonn which will culminate in Baku at COP29 on 11-24 November, and a list of challenges/questions which European climate and energy policymakers will have to wrestle with along the way over these next few months:
- Does President von der Leyen feel politically strong enough to push an ambitious EU-wide NDC, backed up (as she did indicate in her EP speech) by a 90% 2040 target for adoption in the first half of 2025? And where will transitioning away from fossil fuels – building on COP28 – figure in that NDC?
- Where will the Commission’s clean industrial plan land on controversial technologies like carbon capture and hydrogen? And what can it meaningfully promise about energy prices, to combat the volume of the sceptics who have still not given up their arguments about climate science and business-as-usual energy security?
- Alongside this, can the Commission stitch together a coherent policy towards Chinese EVs which can both support European industrial competitiveness and benefits for European consumers?
- In the meantime, will the Commission hold firm on the Green Deal, including the 2035 exit date from new petrol and diesel cars (where mutterings continue from some of the industrial base, but where the approach towards e-fuels – another “controversial technology” – may be a complicating factor)? A governance framework with linkages to the industrial strategy and investment might help to underpin Green Deal delivery.
- Internationally, can the EU mobilise Western partners and others behind a plan for the COP which rescues the climate finance talks from failure and helps to restore some trust with Global South countries on financing the transition?
- While it may judge it has more urgent priorities, it will be interesting to see whether the new UK government starts work on translating the early positive vibes with the EU into tangible co-operation on European decarbonization.
- Will the Azerbaijani Government – who claim they can bridge the gap between the Global North and the Global South – turn their vague rhetoric into results at COP29?
- How will the EU face up to the strong possibility of Trump 2.0 in the US – on climate as well as all other key issues such as defence and Ukraine?
